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An obligation is a requirement to take (or not to take) a course of action by virtue
of a command. Commands can be internal to the individual, or external. In eco-
nomics it is usually assumed that external rules can modify behaviour with respect
to internal commands only if they provide incentives to do so. In particular, in or-
der to improve eﬃciency in contexts in which individual and social interests are not
aligned, economists recognize the importance of punishing deviating behaviors to
induce individuals to conform to norms of conduct. Financing public goods through
taxation and designing adequate sanctions for tax evaders is an example of the more
general economic approach to the analysis of law (Polinsky and Shavell 2000).
It has, however, been argued that legal obligations also exert ‘expressive’ in-
ﬂuences on individuals’ behavior that are independent of the system of material
incentives they entail (Kahan 1998, Cooter 1998, Kreps 1997, Bowles 1998). We de-
note as ‘expressive’ those formal obligations that mantain no incentives (sanctions
or rewards) to comply with.
The theory of expressive law has emphasized the positive eﬀect that expressive
obligations may exercise on eﬃciency in social situations. Two main arguments
have been suggested. On the one hand, expressive obligations may be representa-
tive of moral and ethical values that, once internalized, shape subjective preferences
and aﬀect individuals’ behaviors (Kahan 1997, Cooter 1998). On the other hand,
in several social games with multiple equilibria, expressive obligations, by intro-
ducing standards of behavior and focal points, may enhance coordination (Cooter
1998, McAdams 2000). More in general, we say that an expressive obligation exerts
crowding-in eﬀects when it induces subjects to act more pro-socially and improves
social welfare.
Nevertheless, in many situations characterized by social interactions, external in-
terventions (such as formal regulations or legal rules) may also undermine intrinsic
motivations to engage in pro-social behaviors (Kreps 1997, Frey 1997, Bowles 1998).
In their review on ‘motivation crowding theory’, Frey and Jegen (2001) highlight
two psychological processes that explain why external regulations may crowd-out
intrinsic motivations. According to the ‘impaired self-determination’ process, indi-
viduals with an intrinsic motivation for pro-social behavior may feel overjustiﬁed
by an external regulation, which may then takes full psychological control for the
achievement of a social goal. Likewise, according to the ‘impaired self-esteem’ pro-
cess, external regulations may induce subjects to feel as if their intrinsic motivation
to adopt pro-social behaviors is not acknowledged. As a result, intrinsically moti-
vated subjects would reduce their eﬀort towards cooperation.
Crowding-in and crowding-out eﬀects of external regulations have been docu-
mented in a variety of contexts by a growing empirical literature, mainly (but not
exclusively) experimental.1 Most of the existing evidence, however, does not disen-
tangle the role of material incentives (sanctions or rewards) endorsed by external
regulations from their expressive eﬀects (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Bohnet
et al. 2001, Falk and Kosfeld 2006).
The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to this literature. We report
results from a repeated linear public good experiment in which, in each period, sub-
1See Frey and Jegen (2001) for references containing experimental evidence.
2jects are required to contribute at least a minimum amount to the public good and
face a certain probability to be audited. Audited subjects that have contributed
less than the minimum obligation must pay a sum equal to the diﬀerence between
the amount required and their contribution. Thus, the obligation is ‘expressive’
since the penalty surcharge is zero and there is no monetary incentive to comply
with the formal regulation. We compare results from treatments in which various
levels of minimum contributions are required with those from a benchmark, namely
a standard linear public good game (VCM). We observe that expressive obliga-
tions produce both crowding-in and crowding-out eﬀects. In particular, while in the
treatments with the obligations voluntary contributions are positively associated
with the minimum payment required, introducing the expressive obligations per se
have a negative eﬀect on voluntary contributions.
Crowding-in and crowding-out are better detected in a regression analysis that
allows to disentangle and separately measure the two eﬀects. We ﬁnd that crowding-
out eﬀects are stronger in treatments in which sanctions collected through the au-
diting procedure increase the payoﬀ of non audited group members rather than in
treatments in which they simply represent dead-weight loss. We also quantify the
extent of crowding-in and crowding-out by estimating the break-even minimum con-
tribution in treatment with expressive obligations to raise a level of public good at
least as great as in the VCM.
The most related papers to ours are Tyran and Feld (2006) and Galbiati and
Vertova (2008). Tyran and Feld (2006) consider a one-shot game in which partici-
pants can choose either to contribute the entire endowment to the public good or to
give nothing. They study the eﬀect of deterrent sanctions versus non-deterrent sanc-
tions and ﬁnd that non-deterrent sanctions have an eﬀect on cooperation only when
they are self-imposed through majority voting. More similar to our setting, Galbiati
and Vertova (2008) design an experiment in which audited subjects can be either
sanctioned or rewarded according to the sign of the diﬀerence between their actual
contribution and the stated obligation. Since reward and penalty are linear around
the obligation, a risk neutral self-interested individual should be unaﬀected by the
levels of the obligation. However, authors ﬁnd that contributions respond positively
to variations in obligations, even after controlling for subjective risk aversion.
There are two main diﬀerences with respect these contributions and ours. First,
our design allows us to clearly disentangle the eﬀects of introducing an expressive
obligation per se from those implied by the scheme of incentives it endorses. Sec-
ond, neither of the previous studies, nor as far as we know other studies, have
attempted to separately measure the crowding-in and crowding-out eﬀects of ex-
pressive obligations. Understanding, however, whether expressive obligations can
generate crowding-in and crowding-out eﬀects and whether the eﬀects are mutually
exclusive or can simultaneously aﬀect behaviour are theoretically and empirically
important questions. Moreover, the two eﬀects may totally or partially cancel out
and separately measuring the two eﬀects may be fundamental to draw correct con-
clusion about the real impact of expressive obligations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the ex-
perimental design and state the theoretical predictions. In section 3, we present
results. Final remarks and a discussion on the implications of our ﬁndings are in
the conclusion.
32 Experimental design and theoretical predictions
2.1 Design
Our experiment consists of six treatments. We run two sessions for each treat-
ment. At the beginning of each session, 24 subjects are randomly and anonymously
partitioned into 6 groups of 4 members that remain unchanged throughout the 15
periods of the session. The baseline treatment is a linear public good game played
in partners condition (VCM). In every period, each subject allocates an endowment
of 30 tokens between a private and a collective account. Subjects make their choices
simultaneously and anonymously. Tokens allocated to the private account generate
a private beneﬁt, whereas tokens allocated to the group account are collectively and
mutually remunerative. In particular, a subject receives 2 points for each token she
allocates to the individual account, while receives 1 point for each token allocated
by her, or by any other member of her group, to the collective account. Thus,
the marginal per capital return from allocating tokens to the collective account is
0.5, implying that the unique sub-perfect Nash equilibrium is a situation in which
everybody contributes nothing to the public good.
Results of the baseline treatment are compared with subjects’ performance in 5
diﬀerent treatments: NORED(5), NORED(10), NORED(18), RED(10) and RED(18).
There are two main diﬀerences between the baseline and the additional treatments,
henceforth referred to as the obligation treatments. First, in each period of the
obligation treatments, subjects are asked to contribute at least s tokens - the obli-
gation level - to the collective account. The obligation level is constant within each
session, though it varies across treatments. Namely, we considered three values of
s: a low level, 5 - in NORED(5) -, an intermediate level, 10 - used in NORED(10)
and RED(10) - and a high level, 18 - used in NORED(18) and RED(18). While the
low and the high obligation levels were exogenously chosen, the intermediate level
is set to the median contribution observed in the ﬁrst period of the baseline VCM
sessions (which were run in advance with respect to the sessions of the obligation
treatments).
The second diﬀerence is that, after having taken their choices in a period, par-
ticipants to the obligation treatments enter an audit stage. In particular, at the
beginning of each session, subjects are informed that, in every period, there is the
possibility that their contributions are randomly selected and audited in order to
verify their correspondence with the obligation level. The audit stage consists of
a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, the computer randomly determines, with
equal probability, whether the group enters the second step of the audit stage or
rather if it directly moves to the next period of the session. In the case the second
step is undertaken, the computer selects randomly and with equal probability one of
the four group members. Thus, in each period, the contribution of any subject has
probability 1/8 of being selected and audited. If the contribution to the collective
account made by the selected subject is greater than or equal to the obligation level,
then the audit stage does not produce any eﬀect neither on her payoﬀ nor on those of
the other group members. On the other hand, in the case the contribution is lower,
the payoﬀ of the selected subject is reduced by one point for each token of diﬀerence
between the obligation level and her contribution. Concerning the eﬀects of the sum
paid by the selected subject on the payoﬀ of the other group members, we consider
4Table 1: Point-payoﬀs in experimental settings
Settings Payoﬀs





2(30 − xi,t) +
 4
j=1 xj,t with probability (1 − pq);
2(30 − xi,t) − max{s − xi,t;0} +
 4





2(30 − xi,t) +
 4
j=1 xj,t with probability (1 − p);
2(30 − xi,t) − max{s − xi,t;0} +
 4
j=1 xj,t with probability pq;
2(30 − xi,t) +
 4
j=1 xj,t + max{s − xz,t;0} with probability p(1 − q)
two diﬀerent settings. In NORED(5), NORED(10) and NORED(18) payments do not
aﬀect payoﬀs of non selected subjects. On the contrary, in RED(10) and RED(18),
the sum paid by the selected subject increases the payoﬀ of any other group member
by the same amount.
2.2 Predictions
We study individuals’ contributions to the collective account in the various treat-
ments. Let xi,t be the contribution to the collective account of subject i in period
t. Let p be the probability that the group proceeds to the second step of the audit-
ing procedure and, conditional on that, let q be the probability of a subject to be
audited.
The payoﬀ in points of subject i in period t under the NORED(s), the RED(s)
and the VCM setting are shown in Table 1. In the VCM the individual receives
Πi,t = 2(30 − xi,t) +
 4
j=1 xj,t. In the NORED(s), payoﬀ depends on whether a
subject is audited. In particular, she receives 2(30 − xi,t) +
 4
j=1 xj,t either when,
with probability 1−pq, she is not audited, or when, with probability pq, she is audited
and allocates at least the required minimum contribution of s tokens to the collective
account. On the other hand, she receives 2(30 − xi,t) − (s − xi,t) +
 4
j=1 xj,t when,
with probability pq, she is audited and allocates less than s tokens to the collective
account.
As stressed above, for given s, the only diﬀerence between NORED(s) and RED(s)
treatments is that, in the latter, payments taken away from the audited subject
increase the payoﬀ of the other group members. Thus, a subject receives 2(30 −
xi,t) +
 
j=i xj,t either when, with probability (1 − p), her group does not enter
the second step of the auditing procedure, or when, with probability pq, she is
audited and allocates at least s tokens to the collective account, or in the case that,
with probability p(1 − q), her group participates to the second step of the auditing
procedure, she is not selected for auditing and the audited group member allocates
at least s tokens to the collective account. Symmetrically, she receives 2(30−xi,t)−
(s−xi,t)+
 
j=i xj,t when, with probability pq, she is audited and allocates less than s
tokens to the collective account. Finally, she receives 2(30−xi,t)+(s−xz,t)+
 
j=i xj,t
when, with probability p(1 − q), her group enters the second step of the auditing
procedure, she is not audited and the audit group member, z, allocates less than s
tokens to the collective account.
Determining the equilibrium contributions under the assumption of self-
5interested subjects in the three treatments is straightforward. In the VCM, given the
contributions of the other group members, the payoﬀ function is maximized when
xi,t = 0. The same prediction applies, for given s, in NORED(s) and RED(s). Sup-
pose that the subject takes her decisions according to the expected utility theory. In
any period t of, say, NORED(s), given the contribution of the other group members,
each subject chooses xi,t to maximize the following expected utility:
2(30 − xi,t) +
4  
j=1
xj,t − pq   max{(s − xi,t),0} (1)
The previous expression strictly decreases in xi,t. Thus, it is maximized for
x∗
i,t = 0: in other words, since the worse that can happen to a self-interested subject
in NORED(s) is to be convicted to pay the amount (s − xi,t) if audited, there is no
reason for her to give more than what allocated in the standard VCM. The same holds
in RED(s) treatments, although in this case the payments of the audited subjects
increase the payoﬀs of the other group members.
The prediction that the equilibrium is invariant across treatments holds under
the assumption of self-interested agents (regardless of the degree of risk aversion),
as well as under diﬀerent generalizations of the expected utility theory. The reason
is in the ‘expressive’ nature of the obligation used in our experiment that does not
modify the material incentive to free-ride and contribute nothing.
When behaviours depart from self-interest, predictions become less certain. Var-
ious models of pro-social behaviour have in particular been proposed in the litera-
ture to explain why many individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations, like
indeed in public good experiments.2 With models of voluntary cooperations the
eﬀect of expressive obligations depend on the way internal motivations for giving
are aﬀected. In the Introduction we have anticipated diﬀerent hypotheses about the
possible impacts. First of all, on the one hand, the level s of expressive obligation
may become under some non-selﬁsh approaches a natural benchmark to conform
behaviour. For example, in ‘reciprocity theories’, which are based on the idea that
individuals cooperate by matching the contribution of others, s may oﬀer a focal
point for coordinating beliefs about the contributions of others. An increase in s
may then bring more cooperation favoring coordination on a higher level of con-
tributions. According to the theory of expressive law, legal norms can sometimes
aﬀect people’s preferences and motives even more directly by communicating and
shaping social values. In such a case, expressive obligations may induce or increase
pro-social behaviour per se.
From an opposite perspective, external regulations may weaken the power of
internal ethical constraints. According to motivation crowding-out, by resolving the
internal conﬂict between self-interest and moral constraints, formal and external
mechanism delegated to reach social goal may discourage the genuine attitude of
individuals to act pro-socially.3 Following the motivation crowding-out argument,
treatments with expressive obligations may be associated to lower contributions
2Models of other-regarding preferences or non-selﬁsh models of voluntary giving for example
include theories of unconditional commitments, reciprocity theories, theories of social preferences,
altruism theories and theories of ‘warm-glow’ giving (surveys in, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 2003, Sobel
2005). See Croson (2007) for a recent experimental test of the various theories.
3As alluded to in the introduction, crowding out eﬀects have indeed been documented by a
rather large literature. However, most of the existing evidence is concerned with situations and
6when compared with subjects’ performances in the standard VCM. Moreover, a
stronger crowding-out may be expected in the RED(s) settings in which payments
collected through the monitoring activity are returned to the public fund, since the
substitution of internal motivations by external control in the provision of the public
good may be perceived even more pervasive.
Obviously, which precise eﬀect and with which strength is actually at work is
at the end an empirical question which the experiment addresses. It is clearly also
possible that various eﬀects are simultaneously at work.
2.3 Implementation
For each treatment we collected data from 12 independent groups of 4 subjects
divided in two sessions of 6 groups each. Overall, 288 subjects participated in the
experiment. Subjects, mainly undergraduate students in Economics and Statistics,
were recruited by e-mail using a list of voluntary potential candidates. At their
arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal, instructions were
read aloud and questions were privately answered by experimenters.4 On average,
subjects earned a payment of 11.13 euro which was privately paid in cash at the
end of the session. Each session lasted about one hour including time for reading
the instructions and paying subjects. The experiment took place at the EELAB
(Experimental Economics Laboratory) of the University of Milan – Bicocca between
June and September 2009. The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree
software (Fischbacher, 2007).
3 Experimental results
Figure 1 reports the ‘box-plots’ of the distributions of individual contributions from
period 1 to 15 for the six experimental treatments. In the individual plots boxes
denote 25%, 50% and 75% quartiles; the upper whisker stretches to the upper ad-
jacent value and the lower to the lower adjacent value. Outside values are marked
by circles. The lines in the plots of the obligation treatments correspond to the
diﬀerent obligation levels. As remarked above, the intermediate level s = 10 in the
NORED(10) and RED(10) obligation treatments corresponds to the ﬁrst period me-
dian of the benchmark VCM treatment. It was though that for this reason the level
could be considered by the majority of individuals close to what they perceive as
an ‘internal’ duty, and therefore particularly interested to be also studied as an ‘ex-
pressive’ command. A higher obligation level s = 18 was introduced for treatments
NORED(18) and RED(18), whereas a lower obligation level was used for NORED(5),
namely s = 5.
There are similarities and diﬀerences between the distributions of contributions
among treatments. Regarding the similarities, the graphs in Figure 1 show positive
contributions from most participants at the beginning of the games in all treatments.
The contributions decrease through the rounds of all treatments both in regard to
experiments in which the external regulations also aﬀected people material incentives. But since
the mechanism underlying the eﬀects is mainly psychological, it appears of particular interest to
control whether and to what extent crowding-out eﬀects also extend to the case in which law has
only an expressive function.
4Instructions of the experiment are in Appendix.










































































8the number of participants giving positive contributions and in the level of the con-
tributions given. Still we see that in all treatments there are some individuals giving
positive contributions even in the last periods of the games. These are usual features
of public good experiments. Nonetheless, it is worth recalling that, on the one side,
the evidence of positive contributions contradicts in all treatments the prediction en-
tailed by purely selﬁsh models of complete free-riding with zero contributions given
to the public good in all periods. On the other side, the trend of decreasing contri-
butions in public good games is often explained with the interaction of purely selﬁsh
individuals with so called ‘conditional cooperators’, namely people who are willing
to contribute more to a public good the more others contribute (Fischbacher et al.
2001). In particular, according to the idea of conditional cooperation, contributions
to public good ‘spiral downwards’ in repeated interactions since non selﬁsh agents5
decrease progressively their contributions in order to respond to the contributions
given by their groups partners and conditioned by the lower contributions given by
free-riders.
We are interested in analyzing how subjects’ contributions vary across exper-
imental treatments. We start with a descriptive analysis of the results which we
split into two parts: ﬁrst we look at the distributions of individual contributions
across treatments and then we look at the average contributions levels. Afterwords
we perform a parametric analysis to better detect the forces which determine the
descriptive evidence.
3.1 Distributions of individual contributions across treatments
Table 2 reports the distributions of contributions underlying the graphs in Figure 1.
Two observations emerge from the data.
First, subjects in the obligation treatments tend to contribute the amount s
required by the obligation more often than in the VCM treatment. For example, in
the ﬁrst period of the VCM, only 6 subjects contribute 5 tokens whereas the same
amount is contributed by 16 subjects in NORED(5). Similarly, 9 subjects contribute
10 tokens in period 1 of the VCM versus 14 and 18 subjects who allocate 10 tokens
to the collective account in NORED(10) and RED(10), respectively. Finally, whereas
no subject contributes 18 tokens in period 1 of the VCM, 8 and 15 subjects meet the
obligation in NORED(18) and RED(18), respectively. This conﬁrms that, at least
in the ﬁrst periods of the sessions, subjects perceive the amount required by the
expressive obligation as a focal point to which they can anchor their contributions.
The eﬀect, however, being stronger at the beginning of the various sessions, becomes
weaker as more periods are played by the subjects due to the general decrease in
the overall level of cooperation.
Table 3 reports results from a diﬀerence-of-proportions test across treatments and
subsets of periods for the null hypothesis that the proportion of subjects contributing
s tokens in the VCM and in the obligation treatments are the same. In particular,
the Table reports z-statistics and p-values of the tests conducted over periods 1-5,
6-10, 11-15 and over the entire sessions.6
5Conditional cooperation can be considered as a motivation for contributing in its own or
be a consequence of some fairness preferences like ‘altruism’, ‘warm-glow’, ‘inequity aversion’ or
‘reciprocity’ (Fischbacher et al. 2001, p. 397).
6In order to take into account for both potential individual dependency over time and dependency
within each matching group, the reported statistics refer to the β-coeﬃcients estimated in a linear
9Table 2: Distributions of contributions per period in experimental treatments
VCM NORED(5)
Tokens Tokens
Periods 0 1-4 5 6-9 10 11-17 18 19-29 30 0 1-4 5 6-9 10 11-17 18 19-29 30
1 8 4 6 1 9 11 0 4 5 11 4 16 0 4 1 0 2 10
2 12 4 8 1 4 8 1 7 3 14 4 17 0 2 2 0 7 2
3 17 2 4 2 6 5 0 10 2 20 6 14 0 2 0 0 6 0
4 13 7 8 1 3 6 0 7 3 21 2 11 0 7 3 0 3 1
5 19 3 6 0 7 4 0 5 4 21 4 14 0 4 1 1 2 1
6 15 4 10 0 8 6 0 4 1 22 4 13 0 3 4 0 1 1
7 18 8 6 1 5 5 0 3 2 19 6 11 1 3 4 0 2 2
8 11 9 6 1 10 4 0 4 3 25 3 10 3 0 2 0 2 3
9 13 5 5 2 8 10 1 3 1 22 2 12 3 3 3 0 2 1
10 19 6 4 0 7 5 0 6 1 29 1 9 0 4 0 1 4 0
11 22 6 7 2 6 4 0 1 0 31 2 9 1 2 1 0 2 0
12 21 5 5 0 7 6 0 1 3 34 2 6 0 2 1 0 2 1
13 20 6 7 0 8 5 0 2 0 30 4 4 0 5 2 0 2 1
14 19 4 9 0 6 7 0 1 2 35 1 3 1 2 2 0 3 1
15 26 4 6 2 3 4 0 1 2 35 2 6 0 3 0 0 0 2
All 257 77 97 13 97 90 2 59 32 369 47 155 9 46 28 2 40 26
NORED(10) RED(10)
Tokens Tokens
Periods 0 1-4 5 6-9 10 11-17 18 19-29 30 0 1-4 5 6-9 10 11-17 18 19-29 30
1 9 1 9 3 14 2 0 5 5 11 0 5 5 18 4 0 3 2
2 13 3 7 2 14 2 0 3 4 12 3 5 8 11 3 0 3 3
3 17 6 7 1 6 6 0 3 2 12 3 6 6 9 6 0 4 2
4 15 4 7 5 10 2 0 3 2 19 1 11 3 7 3 0 3 1
5 18 5 4 1 13 5 0 0 2 20 1 8 4 11 2 1 1 0
6 21 5 8 1 6 2 0 4 1 19 3 7 2 8 5 0 3 1
7 18 7 6 1 10 2 0 2 2 23 4 6 6 4 0 1 4 0
8 20 3 8 1 11 1 0 3 1 26 4 4 4 6 3 0 1 0
9 19 4 3 3 13 4 0 1 1 27 1 8 4 4 4 0 0 0
10 20 5 6 3 9 4 0 1 0 27 1 6 5 6 2 0 0 1
11 23 5 5 3 6 3 0 1 2 27 4 3 4 5 3 0 1 1
12 22 8 6 2 5 1 0 4 0 27 5 4 3 5 2 0 2 0
13 23 6 4 4 5 3 0 3 0 29 2 5 2 4 5 0 0 1
14 28 5 5 0 5 2 0 3 0 29 5 8 2 3 1 0 0 0
15 31 3 6 0 5 2 0 1 0 30 5 6 1 3 2 0 0 1
All 297 70 91 30 132 41 2 37 22 328 42 92 59 104 45 2 25 13
NORED(18) RED(18)
Tokens Tokens
Periods 0 1-4 5 6-9 10 11-17 18 19-29 30 0 1-4 5 6-9 10 11-17 18 19-29 30
1 3 2 4 2 6 9 8 4 10 11 1 2 1 3 5 15 6 4
2 7 3 5 3 2 7 7 10 4 11 1 2 2 6 6 8 9 3
3 8 1 5 3 5 3 11 7 5 19 3 3 0 3 7 6 6 1
4 10 2 5 2 7 10 8 2 2 25 2 4 0 2 5 5 4 1
5 11 2 6 1 6 6 6 6 4 20 2 6 1 3 2 8 3 3
6 16 5 3 4 2 5 5 3 5 19 3 5 1 3 6 7 2 2
7 11 4 5 2 5 7 6 5 3 22 4 3 0 4 4 8 2 1
8 10 2 5 3 6 8 7 3 4 23 4 4 1 1 4 8 1 2
9 14 4 2 4 6 6 4 5 3 22 5 3 1 3 3 7 3 1
10 12 3 4 3 9 5 5 5 2 27 3 3 0 5 3 3 2 2
11 16 5 3 0 5 6 5 6 2 26 3 6 1 1 2 5 3 1
12 15 4 3 1 3 9 8 1 4 22 6 4 1 5 4 2 3 1
13 16 2 4 3 4 5 7 3 4 22 5 2 3 4 4 5 2 1
14 14 2 5 4 5 8 4 2 4 28 4 1 1 5 1 5 2 1
15 19 2 6 4 5 3 3 2 4 30 4 2 0 4 2 3 2 1
All 182 43 65 39 76 97 94 64 60 327 50 50 13 52 58 95 50 25
10Table 3: Diﬀerence-of-proportions tests of contributions equal s across treatments
Pr(xi = s) in VCM = Pr(xi = s) in treatment:
NORED(5) NORED(10) RED(10) NORED(18) RED(18)





















































∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Focusing on the ﬁrst ﬁve periods, the null hypothesis can be rejected (p < 0.01) in
favor of the alternative statement that individuals contribute the required amount s
more often in the obligation treatments than in the VCM. With repetition, this eﬀect
tends to disappear in NORED(5), NORED(10) and RED(10) while it remains highly
signiﬁcant in NORED(18) and RED(18). A reasonable explanation for this evidence
is that, whereas contributing 5 and 10 tokens may represent natural focal choices in
all treatments (regardless of the presence of an obligation), very few subjects in the
VCM are willing to contribute 18 tokens.
A second noteworthy characteristic of the distributions reported in Table 2 (see
also the graphs in Figure 1) is that, in the obligation treatments, subject tend to
contribute “at most” - rather than “at least” - the required amount s. Table 4
presents results from a diﬀerence-of-proportions test conducted similarly as above,
across treatments and subsets of periods, for the null hypothesis that the propor-
tion of subjects contributing more than s tokens in the VCM and in the obligation
treatments are the same.7 Notice that, when the null hypothesis is rejected, two
alternatives can be speciﬁed: a) expressive obligations exert crowding-in such that
the number of subjects contributing more than s tokens is higher in the obliga-
tion treatments than in the VCM; b) expressive obligations crowd-out contributions,
such that the number of subjects contributing more than s tokens is higher in the
VCM than in the obligation treatments. Looking at Table 4, we reject the null hy-
pothesis in favour of the crowding-out eﬀect of expressive obligations in NORED(5),
NORED(10) and RED(10). The null hypothesis is instead not rejected in NORED(18)
and RED(18). This can be explained with the fact that, regardless of the presence of
an obligation, only a minority of subjects in all treatments contribute more than 18
tokens to the public good. Still, we remark that, at least in comparison with what
two-way random eﬀects model of the following form: yigt = k + αi + γg + β · TREATi + εit, where
yigt takes value 1 if individual i of group g gives s tokens to the public good at round t of her
treatment and takes value 0 otherwise; TREATi is a dummy for the obligation treatment; k is the
constant, αi and γg are the random eﬀects for, respectively, individuals and matching groups.
7The same procedure discussed in the previous footnote applies here. The only diﬀerence with
respect the previous speciﬁcation concerns the dependent variable yigt of the subsidiary regression
that now assumes value 1 if individual i of group g contributes (strictly) more than s tokens at
round t and takes value 0 otherwise.
11Table 4: Diﬀerence-of-proportions tests of contributions greater than s across treat-
ments
Pr(xi > s) in VCM = Pr(xi > s) in treatment:
NORED(5)NORED(10) RED(10) NORED(18) RED(18)





















































∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
observed in the VCM, even in NORED(18) and RED(18) subjects do not contribute
above the amount required by the expressive obligation. In other words, this means
that in all the obligation treatments the eﬀect of expressive obligation is to bring
individual contributions at most at the level of the required s.
3.2 Average contributions across treatments
Figure 2 plots the average contributions in the ﬁve treatments over periods. Panel a)
compares average contributions in the VCM with those in NORED(10), NORED(5)
and NORED(18). The panel shows that the average contributions in the VCM
are lower than those in NORED(18) while they lie above those in NORED(5) and
NORED(10). The average contribution in the VCM overall periods is 7.34 tokens,
passing from 11.1 tokens (slightly more than 1/3 of the initial endowment) in period
1 to 4.8 tokens in period 15. In NORED(10), the average contribution is 10.6 in
period 1, 2.8 tokens in period 15 and 5.85 overall. The average contribution is lower
in NORED(5), in which it passes from 10.1 tokens in the ﬁrst period to 2.6 tokens
in the last period, amounting to 5.10 tokens overall. Finally, in NORED(18) the
average contributions are higher, starting from 15.7 tokens in period 1 and ending
up to 7.6 tokens in period 15 while 10.72 tokens is the overall average.
Table 5 reports, for subsets of 5 periods as well as overall the entire session, results
from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the null hypothesis that median contributions
in the VCM and NORED(s) treatments are the same. The unit of observation in
the statistical test is the group average contribution. Diﬀerences in the average
contribution between VCM and NORED(10) are not statistically signiﬁcant while
those between VCM and NORED(5) are on the edge of statistical signiﬁcance: they
are not statistically signiﬁcant on period 1-5, it is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level
from period 6 onwards.8 Diﬀerences in the average contributions between VCM and
8Interestingly, focusing at early periods, although the average contribution in VCM is relatively
similar to that in NORED(5) (in period 1, the average contribution is 11.1 and 10.1 tokens in the
VCM and NORED(5), respectively), the median contribution in the former is much lower than in
the latter (for example, in period 1, the median is 5 and 10 tokens in NORED(5) and in the VCM,
12Figure 2: Average contributions in periods 1-15: comparisons between treatments.
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3Table 5: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests: VCM versus NORED(s) treatments
Periods


































∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 6: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests: VCM versus RED(s) treatments
Periods























∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
NORED(18) are statistically signiﬁcant (with the exception of periods 6-10) and
more stable over periods.
In panel b) of Figure 2, we compare contributions in the VCM with those in the
RED(s) treatments. In period 1, the average contribution in RED(18) is 13.6 tokens,
a bit higher than in the VCM series. However, starting from period 3 diﬀerences
between the two treatments disappear. The overall average contribution in RED(18)
is 7.56. The RED(10) series lies below the other two treatments in all periods:
the overall average contribution is 5.10 tokens, passing from 8.9 in period 1 to 2.8
tokens in period 15. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test (see Table 6) shows that there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median contribution in the VCM and in RED(18).
Some signiﬁcant diﬀerence between contributions in the VCM and in RED(10) is
detected in periods 6-10, which is also conﬁrmed by the test conducted on all periods.
Panels c) and d) of Figure 2 compare, for the corresponding values of s, the
average contributions in the RED(s) treatments with those in the NORED(s) treat-
ments. Although the graph shows that the average contributions in RED(10) are
below those in NORED(10) for most of the periods, the rank-sum test indicates that
such diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 7). Conversely, the av-
erage contributions are clearly higher in NORED(18) than in RED(18) and this is
conﬁrmed by a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the various subsets of periods as well as
overall.
Summarizing, the evidence from the NORED(s) treatments supports the hypoth-
esis that expressive obligations aﬀect (the average) contributions to the public good.
This is more prominent in NORED(18), where the high amount required by the
obligation (s = 18) brings the average contribution above the level spontaneously
respectively, see Figure 1).
14Table 7: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests: NORED(s) versus RED(s) treatments
Periods























∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
arising in the VCM treatment. There is also evidence that in NORED(5), where
the obligation level is lower than the median giving in the ﬁrst period of the VCM,
contributions are lower than what observed in the benchmark. When the obligation
level is set at the median contribution in the ﬁrst period of the VCM (s = 10),
the expressive obligation does not cause any diﬀerence in subjects’ contributions
with respect the benchmark. However, the behavioral factors that drive contribu-
tions in the VCM and NORED(10) to the same average may not necessarily be the
same: in particular, while decisions in the VCM are voluntarily and freely taken,
in NORED(10) they may reﬂect an initial tendency to conform to the expressive
obligation followed by the predominance of the crowding-out eﬀect in later periods.9
The eﬀects of expressive obligations on subjects’ contributions are further qual-
iﬁed by analyzing data of the RED(s) treatments. In particular, contributions in
these treatments do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those observed in the VCM, nor
even in RED(18) where s is signiﬁcantly higher than the average contributions col-
lected in any round of the VCM. On the contrary, there is evidence that in RED(10)
- namely when the required amount is equal to the median giving in the ﬁrst period
of the benchmark - subjects in the obligation treatment contribute even less than
those participating to the VCM. The evidence that expressive obligations generate
lower contributions when ﬁnes collected through the auditing activity increase the
payoﬀ of non audited group members is also supported by the direct comparison
between NORED(18) and RED(18).
3.3 Regression analysis
The descriptive analysis of the previous sections provides prima facie evidence that
expressive obligations may aﬀect subjects’ contributions through diﬀerent channels,
that are however diﬃcult to disentangle and separately measure. In particular, we
have ﬁrst noticed that, ceteris paribus, subjects tend to conform their contributions
to the obligation level s. Secondly, we have seen that when subjects do not conform
to the obligation, they tend to contribute less (rather than more) than the required
amount. Thirdly, we have detected other potential eﬀects at work, including a lower
propensity of subjects to contribute in the RED(s) treatments rather than in the
NORED(s) treatments. Finally, out of the eﬀects of the expressive obligations, as in
typical public good experiments, we have observed a negative pattern of contribu-
tions over time.
9Clearly, results partially supporting this hypothesis come from Section 3.1; more direct evidence
is provided below.
15Table 8: Regressions - Indipendent variable: contribution
(1) (2)
Tobit Two-way linear
random eﬀect random eﬀect
Period -0.5111∗∗∗ -0.2670∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0248)
Obligation level 0.6641∗∗∗ 0.3853∗∗∗
(0.1458) (0.0915)
Obligation dummy -7.5919∗∗∗ -4.1450∗∗∗
(yes=1; no=0) (2.2826) (1.4324)
Obligation level × -0.2760∗∗∗ -0.1342∗∗
redistribution dummy (0.1003) (0.0631)
Audit in (t − 1) -1.3806∗∗∗ -0.6620∗∗∗
(yes=1; no=0) (0.3620) (0.2051)
Contribution of 0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗





Wald χ2 344.75 303.65
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000




In this section we conduct a regression analysis to better detect the various
eﬀects and to possibly measure the extent of the crowding eﬀects in the various
directions. In Table 8 we report the estimates of a Tobit random eﬀects model,
in which the dependent variable is the individual contribution xi,t. The model
accounts for potential individual dependency over time. For robustness check, we
also report results of a linear two-way random eﬀects model which accounts for
potential individual dependency both over time and within each matching group.
In the regressions, we include the following independent variables: i. a vari-
able ‘period’ to capture the time trend in the data; ii. a variable ‘obligation level’
assuming value 0 in the VCM and 5,10,18 according to the required s in the cor-
responding obligation treatment; iii. an ‘obligation dummy’ taking value 1 in the
obligation treatments and 0 in the VCM treatment; iv. a variable interacting ‘obli-
gation level’ with a ‘redistribution dummy’ variable, the latter taking value 1 in the
RED(s) treatments and 0 in all the other treatments; v. a dummy variable ‘audit in
(t−1)’ assuming value 1 if subject i is audited at period (t−1) and 0 otherwise; vi. a
variable ‘contribution of others in (t−1)’ which stands for the sum of contributions
given in period (t − 1) by the other group members.
16Results from the two econometric models are qualitatively the same and, as
follows, we refer to those from the Tobit model. The coeﬃcients of ‘obligation
level’ and ‘obligation dummy’ are highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.01) and opposite in sign,
positive for the former and negative for the latter. Thus, expressive obligations are
associated with both a crowding-in and a crowding-out eﬀect: while the required
amount, s, positively aﬀects subjects’ contributions, on the other hand the presence
of an expressive obligation per se decreases the overall level of cooperation with
respect the VCM. This also means that there is a qualitative diﬀerence between the
obligation treatments and the benchmark treatment.
Further, the results show that extra crowding-out eﬀects occur in obligation
treatments when ﬁnes collected from auditing are returned to the public good. In
particular, the dummy for the RED(s) treatments interacted with the obligation
level reports a negative sign, indicating that the crowding-out eﬀects due to ex-
pressive obligations are stronger in the RED(s) treatments than in the NORED(s)
treatments, and that the strength of the reduction is the greater the higher is the
obligation level s.10
Additional standard results qualify our evidence. The coeﬃcient of the linear
trend is negative and highly signiﬁcant. Moreover, as observed in other public good
experiments, we ﬁnd a positive and highly signiﬁcant relationships between individ-
ual contributions and the number of tokens allocated to the collective account by
the other group members in the previous period. We also controlled for diﬀerent
strengths of both relationships depending on the treatments, but with negative re-
sults Thus, our evidence indicates that expressive obligations do not seem able to
aﬀect the decline of cooperation over time occurring in a standard VCM game, nei-
ther to overcome the phenomenon of conditional cooperation documented in several
previous public good experiments (Fischbacher et al. 2001). Interestingly, being
audited in period (t−1) reduces contributions in t. A standard explanation for this
result is that subjects who are audited and ﬁned in t−1 seek to recover the loss by
reducing their contribution in t. Alternatively and in line with previous considera-
tions, by replacing internal moral constraints with external coercive control, being
audited may represent an additional source of motivation crowding-out.
3.4 Crowding-in and crowding-out
In line with previous results (Galbiati and Vertova, 2008), we ﬁnd that the obligation
level is positively correlated with contributions. It is interesting that we conﬁrm this
eﬀect in a setting in which obligations do not entail any incentive to comply with.
Moreover, as far as we know, there are no studies that simultaneously disentangle the
crowding-in eﬀect associated with the required amount from the possible crowding-
out eﬀect that obligations per se exert on subjects’ contributions. The latter eﬀect,
in addition, is not neligible. In particular, while contributions increase by 0.664
tokens for each unit of expressive obligation s (the coeﬃcient of ‘obligation level’,
see Table 8 again), the presence of an obligation per se crowds-out contributions
by 7.592 tokens (the coeﬃcient of ‘obligation dummy’). Clearly, this means that
an expressive obligation ﬁxed at the break-even point of 11.432 tokens (namely, the
10We also replicated our estimates by replacing the interaction term with the ‘redistribution
dummy’ alone. Although we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the dummy, the ﬁts of the
models are lower than in that of the regressions presented here.
17ratio between two coeﬃcients) is necessary to restore cooperation in the NORED(s)
treatments at the same level as in the VCM.
In the RED(s) treatments, when points collected through the auditing procedure
increase the payoﬀ of non audited group members, the regression has documented an
additional source of crowding-out measured by the estimated coeﬃcient of the inter-
action term ‘obligation level × redistribution dummy’, which diminishes the positive
impact of each unit of expressive obligation to 0.388 (namely, the diﬀerence between
the estimated coeﬃcients of ‘obligation level’, 0.664, and the interaction term, 0.276),
and raises the ‘break-even’ point to 19.562 tokens (the ratio 7.592/0.388).
Table 9: Estimates of break-even points from tobit model








The estimates of the two break-evens are reported in Table 9 with the correspond-
ing standard errors. It is interesting to compare the estimates with the expressive
obligations used in the experiment.11 In particular, the break-even point of about
11 tokens estimated for the NORED(s) treatments is not far from the value of s = 10
(p ≃ 0.576 in the statistical test), namely the median contribution in the ﬁrst period
of the VCM that is used as expressive obligation in NORED(10) and RED(10). Thus,
the estimated break-even point is coherent with the equivalence found between the
VCM and the NORED(10) treatment in terms of the average contributions (see again
Table 5), though clearly we have now explicit evidence that diﬀerent forces drive the
similar average contributions in the two treatments.
On the other side, the estimate of about 19 tokens for the break-even point in
the RED(s) treatments is greater than s = 10 (p ≃ 0.076) and this explains why the
average contributions in the RED(10) were actually lower than those in the VCM.
The implication is that in the RED(s) treatments crowding-out due to expressive
obligations tends indeed to outweigh crowding-in.
4 Concluding remarks
Theories of expressive law argue that legal norms and external obligations inﬂuence
the behaviour of agents in social interactions beyond the material incentives (sanc-
tions and rewards) they mantain. Testing this intuition is a relevant issue since,
if correct, it implies that we may need less state coercion to stimulate individuals’
cooperation and enhance social welfare.
11The estimates according to the two-way linear model (with truncation) are of the same order,
namely 10.757 (standard errors: 2.7612) for the break-even without redistribution of ﬁnes and
16.501 (standard error: 4.7370) for the break-even with redistribution of ﬁnes.
18In this paper we have experimentally studied the eﬀects of expressive obligations
on individuals’ attitude to cooperate. In particular, we have reported results from
a repeated linear public good game in which, in each period, subjects faced an
expressive obligation to contribute a minimum amount, with a payment for the
transgressors which did not alter their incentive to free-ride.
We ﬁnd that at early periods the majority of individuals contribute what required
by the expressive obligations, conﬁrming that legal rules have a positive eﬀect in
coordinating individuals’ behaviour. Subjects, however, never contribute above what
required by the expressive obligation and contributions tend to decline over periods.
Our results indicate that expressive obligations induce subjects to substitute
intrinsic motivations to contribute with external commands. Using standard para-
metric techniques, we separately measure the crowding-in and the crowding-out
eﬀects of expressive obligations and ﬁnd that the latter eﬀects are not negligible and
stronger when sanctions collected by monitoring activity are returned to the public
good.
The results add to the existing experimental evidence on the expressive power
of legal rules. Our ﬁndigs are consistent with the so called motivational crowd-
ing theory, which suggests that external regulations may generate some unintended
negative eﬀects on eﬃciency mainly because they weaken internal motivations for
pro-social behaviour. Recent contributions have emphasized the importance of tak-
ing into account of these displacement eﬀects of formal obligations when designing
public policies that prescribe speciﬁc incentive schemes (Bowles and Hwang 2008).
The evidence reported in this paper suggests that an analogous attention to the
crowding-out eﬀects of formal rules may be required when considering public poli-
cies based on the notion of self-enforcing law.
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20Appendix
A Instructions used in the experiment
[Instructions were originally written in Italian. The variable x appearing in the in-
structions of RED(10), RED(18), NORED(5), NORED(10), NORED(18) assumed
values 5, 10 and 18 according to the obligation used in the treatment.]
[ALL TREATMENTS]
Welcome. Thanks for participating in this experiment. If you follow the instruc-
tions carefully you can earn an amount of money that will be paid to you in cash
at the end of the experiment. During the experiment you are not allowed to talk
or communicate in any way with other participants. If you have any questions raise
your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer it. The rules that
you are reading are the same for all participants.
General rules
In this experiment there are 24 persons who will interact for 15 periods. At the
beginning of the experiment you will be assigned randomly and anonymously to a
group of four people. Therefore, of the other three people in your group you will
know neither the identity nor the earnings. Finally, the composition of your group
will remain unchanged throughout the experiment.
How your earnings are determined
In each of the 16 periods you have to decide how to allocate an endowment
of 30 tokens between a PRIVATE ACCOUNT and a COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT,
considering the following:
for each token that you allocate to the PRIVATE ACCOUNT, you receive 2 points;
for each token allocated to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT by you or by any other
of the members of your group, every group member receives 1 point.
[RED(10), RED(18), NORED(5), NORED(10), NORED(18)]
In every period, each participant will be asked to allocate at least x tokens to
the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT (required amount). The required amount for the
COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT will remain unchanged throughout the 15 periods of the
experiment.
In each period, there is a chance that your allocation to the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT is randomly selected among those of your group members and audited
in order to verify its correspondence with the required amount. In particular, at
the end of each period and only after each member of your group has decided how
to allocate the 30 tokens between the two funds, the computer will draw randomly
and with equal probability one of two balls, colored RED and GREEN, respectively.
If the selected ball is GREEN, then none of the allocations made by the members
of your group to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT will be audited. On the contrary,
if the selected ball is RED, then the computer will randomly assign to each of
the members of your group one of four tickets, numbered from 1 to 4. At that
point, the computer will draw randomly and with equal probability one of the four
tickets. The allocation to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT made by the owner of
21the selected ticket will be audited. Notice that the probability that your allocation
to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is audited in a period is independent from the
probability of auditing in the other periods.
The eﬀects of the audit stage
If you are the owner of the selected ticket and the number of tokens you have
allocated to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is greater than or equal to the required
amount, then the audit stage does not produce any eﬀect on your earnings in points
of the period, nor on those of your group members. On the other hand, if the number
of tokens you have allocated to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is lower than the
required amount, then your earnings in points in that period will be reduced by one
point for each token of diﬀerence between the required amount and your allocation.
[NORED(5), NORED(10), NORED(18)]
The points taken out from your earning in the audit stage do not produce any
eﬀect on the earnings of the other members of your group.
[RED(10), RED(18)]
The points taken out from your earning in the audit stage increase earnings of
the other members of your group. In particular, the earnings in points obtained by
any of the members of your group in that period will increase by one point for each
token of diﬀerence between the required amount and your allocation.
[VCM]
At the end of each period the computer will display how many tokens you have
allocated to the PRIVATE ACCOUNT, how many tokens you have allocated to the
COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT, how many tokens have been allocated by your group
to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT, how many points you have obtained from the
PRIVATE ACCOUNT, how many points you have obtained from the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT, and how many points you have obtained in total in the period.
[NORED(5), NORED(10), NORED(18)]
At the end of each period the computer will display three consecutive screens.
The ﬁrst screen shows how many tokens you have allocated to the PRIVATE AC-
COUNT and how many tokens you have allocated to the COLLECTIVE AC-
COUNT. The second screen shows whether your group has been audited as con-
sequence of the random procedure explained above. Finally, the third screen shows
the results of the audit procedure, how many points you have obtained from the PRI-
VATE ACCOUNT, how many points you have obtained from the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT, how many points you lose if your allocation to the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT is selected for auditing and you have allocated to the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT less than the required amount, and how many points you have obtained
in total in the period.
[RED(10), RED(18)]
At the end of each period the computer will display three consecutive screens.
The ﬁrst screen shows how many tokens you have allocated to the PRIVATE AC-
COUNT and how many tokens you have allocated to the COLLECTIVE AC-
COUNT. The second screen shows whether your group has been audited as con-
sequence of the random procedure explained above. Finally, the third screen shows
22the results of the audit procedure, how many points you have obtained from the PRI-
VATE ACCOUNT, how many points you have obtained from the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT, how many points you lose if your allocation to the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT is selected for auditing and you have allocated to the COLLECTIVE
ACCOUNT less than the required amount, how many points you earn if the alloca-
tion to the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT made by the member of your group that is
selected for auditing is lower than the required amount, and how many points you
have obtained in total in the period.
[ALL TREATMENTS]
At the end of the experiment the total number of points you have obtained in
the 15 periods will be converted in Euros at the rate 100 points = 1 Euro.
23